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ABSTRACT
5Two observations
Q1
stand out from the Russian strategic outlook. First,
it corresponds with the real politik vision of world politics where the
states engage in (zero-sum) competition for power and
resources. Second, the new world order emerges because of
a conflict between different models of development and value sys-
10tems. These two observations highlight a certain “family resem-
blance” between the current Russian assessment of the current
security environment and the situation during the Cold War.
Furthermore, Russian national security strategy is oriented toward
achieving strategic stability with the other great powers. The main-
15tenance of strategic parity (nuclear and conventional deterrence) is
a means to this end. However, given Russia’s relative weakness in
comparison to its major geopolitical competitors, this has led to the
renewal of the Cold War-era concept of asymmetric approach.
Although this concept is most often used in the context of nuclear
20deterrence and the debate on “strategic stability,” it is not about
military security only. The set of asymmetric measures from economic
dependence or sanctions, to diplomatic, political, and informational
measures are used to prevent an emergence of a conflict that would
threaten Russia’s sovereignty and domestic stability. The purpose of
25this paper is to explore the Soviet roots of Active Measures and how
the Soviet heritage is present at both the theoretical level and in
concrete practices. Finally, insights from the conceptual analysis are
applied in assessing the vulnerability of the Nordic countries, in
particular Finland and Sweden, to Russian influence operations.
KEYWORDS
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Introduction
The current Russian national security strategy was adopted in December 2015.1 The new
version replaced the strategy prepared during the Medvedev presidency in 2010. The
strategy juxtaposes positive achievements, such as Russia’s “independent foreign and
domestic policy,” against the background of negative developments and intensifying
35threats towards Russia. Accordingly, “the strengthening of Russia is taking place against
a backdrop of new threats to national security that are multifarious and interconnected
natureQ2 .”2 The strategy portrays Russia as an actor that is not fully able to realize its
national interests. The reason for this is the “West’s stance” on the Eurasian integration
process that is “exerting negative influence on the realization of Russia’s national
40interests.”3 Although the text does not make direct reference to Ukraine, from the context
it can be assumed that the question is about Ukraine’s reluctance to embrace a Russia-led
Eurasian economic integration project.4
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Overall, the strategy frames the ongoing regional and local conflicts as a part of larger
change, whereby “a new polycentric model of the world order” is taking shape. This process is
45“accompanied by an increase in global and regional instability” and growing competition
between social development values and models, as well as, competition for scientific, human
and technological potentialQ3 .”5 In fact, Russian strategic documents identify the competition
for natural resources as a major driver of instability in international politics.6 This type of
argumentation exemplifies the real politik vision of world politics where the states engage in
50(zero-sum) competition for power and resources. The final outcome of this struggle, as
suggested in the above, is an emergence of new “world order,” that is, a new state of
equilibrium between the major powers.7 Thus, the new world order equals “strategic stability”
that is defined in the National Security Strategy as a state of affairs (between the great powers)
“based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, noninterference in states’ internal affairs,
55mutually beneficial cooperation, and a political settlement of global and regional crisis
situations.”8
The strategic documents identify the preferred future trajectory of world politics. The
initial reactions from the Russian research community to the conflict in Ukraine interpreted
it as “a final nail in the coffin of the cold war”9 and an opportunity to re-negotiate the
60European security architecture. The worsening of the conflict in summer 2014 (after the
downing of a MH17 on July 17, 2014), according to Sergei Karaganov, a well-known foreign
policy analyst, suggested that although Russia’s ability to craft the “Russian World” out of
thin air was no longer in doubt, the use of Active Measures in the neighbouring country was
not without risks. Here Karaganov refers to the economic sanctions but also to the
65possibility that the large quantities of armaments and groups of armed men fighting in
the Eastern Ukraine would have a negative impact in the neighbouring regions of Russia.10
A similar conclusion drawn to the above-mentioned is found in the strategic documents
that emphasize a heightened sense of military and non-military threats towards Russia.11
With hindsight, an expectation that Russia would become a stabilizer and “one of the
70key guarantors of global and regional stability”12 seems overly optimistic. In fact, the
IMEMO forecast for 2015 observed, that “in 2014 in Russian political discourse there was
no mentioning of the country’s role as a ‘counter-balance’ and ‘stabilizer’ of world
international relations.”13 The 2017 analysis takes an even more conservative view on
the larger change, arguing that the “current post-order condition of world politics is
75unlikely to herald a transition to a new world order in the years to come.” The point is
that none of the major players of world politics can push forward its vision of the new
order. Instead, all the players are preparing for the “big bargain”—trying to shape the
conditions of a new era to gain maximum economic and political benefit.14
The latest IMEMO forecast (2018) takes note of Russia’s increased activity in managing
80regional crises (an explicit reference to Syria), heightened “anti-Russian” fervor in the
Western media, and concludes that the continuing crisis in Ukraine is the major impedi-
ment of cooperation. However, it concludes that a compromise achieved in the settlement
of the crisis in Ukraine would be a major boost for Russian foreign policy and economic
development.15 A much more common approach to this situation, expressed in the above-
85mentioned security documents, is to emphasize Russia’s resolve in defending its national
security interests and the importance of an asymmetric approach in achieving this goal.16
With this concept it is argued that Russia is engaged in the active defence of its national
security interests, including the use of Active Measures in preventing or neutralizing the
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emergence of a conflict that would threaten Russia’s sovereignty and domestic political
90stability. The next section will discuss in more detail how this idea has evolved in the
Russian debate on security and military policy.
The asymmetric approach: active defence of national interests
The concept of “asymmetric approach” has a rich history both inWestern andRussianmilitary
thought.17 In the Russian context, the term “strategic asymmetry”was used in the late 1980s as
95a response to the US Strategic Defence Initiative and implied a task to use vulnerabilities in
a system to the Soviet Union’s advantage. In the post-ColdWar environment, the retired army
general and President of the Russian Academy of Military Science, Makhmut Gareev, saw
indirect actions as a means to prevent wars and military conflicts. According to Gareev, the
relative weight of indirect actions would increase in the future. This was mainly because of
100three factors: nuclear deterrence, a tendency for the maximum preservation of professional
armies, and the refusal of direct support of conflicts by the great states.18
Later, however, Gareev pinpointed practical reasoning for asymmetric actions as stemming
from the fact that “Russia’s economic and military might is incommensurable with the
capabilities of the former Soviet Union and the United States.” Given this situation, Gareev
105argued, “we must respond to emerging threats in a more flexibleQ4 and, if possible, not direct,
butQ5 asymmetric measures.”He went on to define asymmetric approach as a set of interrelated
political, diplomatic, information, economic, military, and other measures that deter, reduce,
or avert threats of unacceptable consequences as a result of retaliatory actions. Although
Gareev emphasizes the role of asymmetric actions as means of preventing a conflict, another
110interpretation is implicit as well.19 Using a full spectrum of means from political, informa-
tional, economic, financial, and military spheres, the adversary can be put into a defensive
posture and off balance, and thus, conditions are created for (potential military) surprise.20
This idea was written into the 2009 National Security Strategy and appears also in the new
version of the strategy. Accordingly, asymmetric measures, such as economic, informational,
115cyber, and diplomatic resources are used “to prevent the use of armed force against Russia,
and to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”21
The renewed Russian Military Doctrine goes further. Accordingly, the basic features of
modern conflicts include the synchronized use of the military force together with political,
economic, information, and other non-military measures and the protest potential in the
120society.22 In Russian thinking, these measures are seen as part of the geopolitical struggle
between the great powers.23 Furthermore, it is assumed that foreign countries try to
undermine Russia’s political stability by “remote controlling” groups that are critical towards
the political leadership of the country.24 What is not problematized in this debate are the
ways in which Russian authorities themselves use “political technologies”25 to manipulate
125domestic public perceptions. The following sections review the evolution of three different
but complementary concepts: organizational weapon, reflexive control, and Active
Measures. Taken together these concepts describe what the asymmetric approach is about.
The Soviet roots of asymmetric approach
It is perhaps ironic, but not at all surprising, that on the eve of the 100-year anniversary of the
130October Revolution, the Russian Security Council has commissioned a study on how to
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prevent the emergence of a “romantic revolutionary” stereotype and the formation of an
“aggressive managed (upravlyaemoi) mob” in Russia. The research project is studying how
Russia could take better advantage of so-called “soft power” to protect its national interests.26
This project should be viewed as a continuation of a trend rather than a new phenomenon.
135Already in 2000 the information security doctrine set clear parameters on how the Russian
state aspired to achieve “information superiority” in the domestic sphere. The National
Security Strategy from 2009 identified “nationalist, separatist, radical religion and other
agitation” as a danger to the Russian state. The new version of the strategy, accepted in late
2015, is more specific on these threats, and outlines what can be considered programmatic
140content for the protection of Russian spiritual and historical values.27
The underlying idea expressed in one form or another in this debate is derived from
Lenin, who asserted that propaganda should be a matter of action rather than words.28 In
the Soviet propaganda campaigns that followed, this idea was interpreted to mean that all
agitation should be tied to some concrete goal.29 However, the basic idea goes further than
145that. Writing in 1906 in On Guerrilla Warfare, Lenin emphasized:
Marxism … positively does not reject any form of struggle. Under no circumstances does
Marxism confine itself to the forms of struggle possible and in existence at the given moment
only, recognizing as it does that new forms of struggle, unknown to participants of the given
period, inevitably arise as the given social situation changes. In this respect Marxism learns, if
150we may so express it, from mass practice, and makes no claim whatever to teach the masses
forms of struggle invented by ‘systemizers’ in the seclusion of their studies.30
This idea of working withmaterial—interpreted in the widest possible sense from a situational
context to human andmaterial resources available at a givenmoment—comes across in Soviet
thinking (e.g., Trotsky) and subsequent Russian analyses. It does not signify a call for just any
155spontaneous action. On the contrary, Lenin was adamant that “secret, casual, unorganized
guerrilla actions” were a recipe for the disorganization of the party, and consequently, the
party’s task was to “take such actions under its control.”31 At this point in time, Lenin’s
organizational weapon was aimed at two concrete goals: the assassination of political enemies
and confiscation of monetary funds from both the government and private persons.32
160However, in his previous writing on the lessons of the Moscow Uprising (1905), Lenin argued
that party activists should learn from this experience and help the masses by stimulating their
creative efforts, and thus further the development of what Lenin called “new barricade
tactics.”33 Therefore, although Lenin relied on what has later become a trademark of the
Russian approach to conflict, i.e., improvisation, he made it clear that the creativity of the
165masses should be controlled from above, that is, by the party functionaries.
Towards this end, a formal Department of Agitation and Propaganda was established
under the Central Committee of the Communist party in August 1920. This department
became known by its acronym agitprop, and its primary function was to coordinate the
propaganda work of different Soviet institutions.34 Curiously, A Dictionary of Scientific
170Communism published in 1984 does not include the term propaganda, but does define
what the stimulation of the creativity of the masses in the Soviet view meant. The idea was
expressed with the concept of “political manoeuvring” defined as “the ability [of the party
leadership] to direct the mass movement in the right way, depending on the objective
situation.” Depending on the “ebb” and “flow” of the revolutionary moment, the manoeuvr-
175ing could take the form of a political offensive, retreat, defence, and mustering of forces.35
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In the context of more theoretically oriented debates on warfare and information war in
particular, political manoeuvring is known by another name. An organizational weapon is
the creative energy of the masses organized and directed by the authorities to hit a specific
target.36 Writing on Soviet psychological warfare, Wilbur Schramm provides the following
180explanation for this concept:
The word does not typically stand alone in Soviet planning. From the very first, Communists
were told by their leaders that words were not enough, that words had to merge with deeds,
and both into organization… . When we try to describe Soviet psychological operations,
therefore, we talk not so much about a word weapon as about an organization weapon.37
185This concept is not used in current Russian military literature; for example, there is no such
entry in the Encyclopedia of Information-Psychological War from 2011.38 In the framework of
public and populist oriented debate, several different meanings are attached to this concept.
For example, it has been referred to as a rough equivalent of “network-centric warfare.”39
Other examples include the characterization of ISIS as an organizational weapon and the
190claim made by economist Sergei Glazyev that “strategic planning” can be regarded as
a powerful organizational weapon.40 In fact, Izborskii Klub, a well-known community of
conservative-patriotic thinkers, including the above-mentioned Glazyev, seems to have devel-
oped this concept further, or at least uses it systematically in its writings. In an essay titled
“Organizational Weapons: The Functional Emergence and System of a 21st-century
195Technology” published in late 2013, the origins of the concept are traced to Aleksandr
Bogdanov, a developer of universal organization theory, an early version of cybernetics.41
The community’s interest towards Bogdanov has most likely been guided by his work on the
“scientific systematization of humanity’s organizational experience in its entirety,”42 which he
called tectology but in which the authors of the above-mentioned essay saw the roots of the
200concept of organizational weapon.
However, the concept of “organizational weapon” is rarely used beyond expert discus-
sion. Instead, an idea of externally organized revolt or mass-protests aimed to overthrow the
legitimate government is expressed with the concept of colour revolution.43 This term refers
to political conflicts that developed in several post-Soviet countries (Georgia 2003, Ukraine
2052004, Kirgisia 2005) during the 2000s. In the 2010s, especially after 2014, historical-regional
connotation of this concept has given way to more analytical usage of the term “colour
revolution.” Gapich and Lushnikov argue that social changes, continuing global economic
crisis, and actualization of the military-political aspect in international relations has led to
the symbiosis of social-political non-violent methods of civic unrest with military strategy
210and tactics. To back up this claim, authors refer to several concepts, for example, “irregular
warfare” and “small war,” that describe the logic of colour revolutions.44 They refer to
“specialists of political upheavals” but refrain from directly accusing the Western countries
(namely the United States) of attempts to use these techniques against Russia.
After 2014, many popular books, and even some academic publications, have built their
215argument around this potential threat from theWest. For example, an article published in the
Russian military academy journal in 2017, named the United States as an agent, “creating of
cataclysms designed to harm the security of single states and whole regions.”45 Authors
present an analysis of “political regime transformation technology,” pinpointing the reasons,
mechanisms, and consequences of “nationhood destruction.”46 Their analysis is oriented at
220understanding the contemporary situation in Russia, with special focus on the presidential
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elections (March 2018), and possible attempts towards de-legitimation of the election result
(and thus, the legitimation of the political system under Putin). Although this type of practice
oriented analyses dominate the public debate, the majority of articles published by profes-
sional military analysts seek to explain interplay between transformation of warfare, the role of
225information war (understood broadly) in it, and specific Russian ways of war. A good example
is A. Derbin’s article where he integrates the civilizational dimension (world divided into
Western and Eastern civilizations) with detailed analysis of what constitutes peace and war.
Derbin divides the struggle for geopolitical power into political, economic, and information
spheres, andmakes a distinction between direct and indirect forms of aggression. The indirect
230forms include psychological, information, and other operations. Furthermore, the category of
“other operations” includes hybrid, soft power, small intensity operations, sanctions, isolation
and blockades, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.47
Derbin’s matrix builds on the assumption that the direct and indirect measures are
a form of geopolitical struggle for power, as mentioned above, and thus, guided by state
235security interests. This is the frame of interpretation explaining political crises in the post-
Soviet space. Although historical-political connotations (a colour revolution understood as
predominantly a post-Soviet phenomenon) have not been revoked, the focus of the debate
has changed. The use of organizational weapon is analyzed in the framework of warfare
where the organization of revolutionary situation is only a first stage towards a bigger goal:
240the struggle for (geo)political power.
Shaping policies, sentiments, and perceptions with Active Measures
In traditional understanding, an armed conflict (war) means the physical destruction of
the enemy. At the same time, an attack can be regarded as successful when it leads to the
“self-disorganization” and “self-disorientation” of the adversary, and the subsequent
245capture of the enemy’s resource base and its usage to the benefit of the attacker.48 The
theory of reflexive control, intensively developed by Soviet military and civilian theorists
since the early 1960s, explains and provides practical means for achieving the “self-
disorganization” of the enemy. According to V. A. Lefebvre, one of the thinkers behind
the theory, reflexive control is “a process by which one enemy transmits the reasons or
250bases for making decisions to another.”49 As explained by Tim Thomas, an expert on
Russian information war:
Reflexive control occurs when the controlling organ conveys (to the objective system) motives
and reasons that cause it to reach the desired decision, the nature of which is maintained in
strict secrecy. A ‘reflex’ itself involves the specific process of imitating the enemy’s reasoning
255or imitating the enemy’s possible behavior and causes him to make a decision unfavorable to
himself.50
The task, so to speak, is to find a weak link in the enemy’s “filter” and exploit it. The filter
is “made up of concepts, knowledge, ideas and experience,” and it can be targeted by an
information weapon defined as a “specially selected piece of information capable of
260causing changes in the information processes of information systems in accordance with
the intent of the entity using the weapon.”51 This is what in Soviet terminology was meant
by disinformation. As described by Ladislav Bittman in an essay published in 1985,
disinformation is “a carefully constructed, false message that is secretly introduced into
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the opponent’s communication system to deceive either his decision-making elite or
265public opinion.”52 For this purpose, various channels were used, including rumours,
forgeries, manipulative political actions, agents of influence, front organizations, and
other means.53 As explained by Bittman, Soviet disinformation operations were:
Acts of opportunity reflecting the long-term interests of the Soviet Union. Their primary
objective is to add another drop of venom to the opponents’ internal system which the
270expectationQ6 that eventually, after a certain period of time, quantity will become quality and
the patient will die.54
It should be emphasized that each of these concepts discussed in this chapter describes
techniques that can be used both in the domestic context and as a foreign and security
policy resource. The concept of Active Measures is predominantly used in Western litera-
275ture on Soviet influence operations during the 1980s, and thus it reflects the Western
understanding of the Soviet foreign policy toolbox. In fact, it can be argued that the current
discussion on Russia’s hybrid war reflects this earlier debate, at least when it comes to
conceptualizing Russia’s actions with terminology that is understandable to the Western
expert community. However, the bottom line of this discussion then and now is that none of
280the techniques used for influencing others (abroad and at home) work in isolation.
As defined in a study published in 1984, Active Measures are “certain overt and covert
techniques for influencing events and behaviour in, and the actions of, foreign
countries.”55 Active Measures may entail the following objectives:
– influencing the policies of another government
285– undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions
– disrupting the relations between other nations
– discrediting and weakening governmental and non-governmental opponents.
The means of conducting these actions include:
– attempts to deceive the target
– attempts to distort the target’s perceptions of reality.
The research published in 1984 on Soviet Active Measures distinguishes between “overt
290propaganda” and “covert political techniques.”56 Overt propaganda is defined as “written
or oral information which deliberately seeks to influence and/or manipulate the opinions
and attitudes of a given target grouping.” Characteristic features of Soviet overt propa-
ganda, according to the study, were its continuity, flexibility, and adaptability. Soviet
propaganda was designed to work on the target for an extended period of time, and
295only the intensity of the campaign varied. Propaganda was flexible in the sense that the
Soviets were able to adapt to changing circumstances rapidly and coordinate words with
actions promptly. Furthermore, “intentional misrepresentation” of events and phenomena
was utilized as one of the tools of deception.57 There was nothing peculiar about these
techniques in the Soviet view. Since propaganda in general was considered an integral part
300of the socialist system, the use of Active Measures was regarded as a legal and legitimate
part of the country’s foreign policy.58
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A general conclusion drawn from previous research is that the success of
a disinformation operation “depends on the willingness of the audience to be deceived.”
To achieve this outcome, “the perpetrator of the disinformation uses the language the
305audience wants to hear.”59 Describing Western susceptibility to Soviet disinformation, Uri
Ra’nan remarks that Western media adopted “language usage in the Soviet manner,” for
example, by making reference to “Afghan terrorists” and “routinely describing almost any
anti-Western guerrilla campaign as a resistance movement.”60 Today, a similar phenom-
enon can be observed in the context of war in Ukraine. Western politicians and publicist
310refer to the war in Ukraine using the Russian vocabulary of “civil war.” Another example
is a generic reference to the “NATO enlargement.” The frame of interpretation is
geopolitical advance of the military alliance towards Russia, rather than the choice made
by individual countries upon their sovereign right.
Finally, as noted by Maurice Tugwell at a conference organized back in 1985, “decep-
315tion, both concealment and misrepresentation, aims at intellectual domination—at putting
the West in a state of ignorance about Soviet activities and intentions that is linked to
a sense of looming power. The desired psychological outcome is to displace faith in self-
defence with faith in appeasement.”61 The Soviets did not achieve this objective with
regard to the Nordic region. The next section will discuss obstacles that Russian strategic
320deception encounters in this region today.
The use of asymmetric methods in the Nordic context: a mission impossible?
In March 2017, Foreign Policy published an article that highlighted resilience of the
Finnish public to Russian influence attempts. The authorities interviewed for the story
argued that Finland’s strong public education system, long history of balancing Russia,
325and a comprehensive government strategy, “allow it to deflect coordinated propaganda
and disinformation.”62 Although Finland clearly is not the main target of Russia’s propa-
ganda operations in Europe, the Finnish authorities have identified around 20 clear
information operations against Finland in the past few years.63 Similar observations
have been made in Sweden where Russian influence operations have been reported.64 In
3302016, the foreign ministers of Sweden and Finland issued a joint declaration in which they
condemn the Russian propaganda and disinformation across the region.65
Russian attempts to influence the US presidential elections in 2016 and subsequent
debate in the US about ways to counter such influence, has concretized this debate in the
Nordic countries as well. In Sweden, the Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is responsible
335for monitoring the threat of foreign information campaigns.66 In Finland, this task is
distributed among government authorities. Since 2017, Finland hosts the EU level agency
with a task of countering hybrid threats. The Hybrid COE is a coordinating unit that will
contribute to the joint understanding, and possible joint counter-actions at the EU level.
These examples tell about a heightened sense of threat of information operations towards
340the EU and individual EU member-states. Thus, the question no longer is whether Russia
is trying to influence the Nordic countries through different measures, but how effective or
intensive this influence is. Previous research on this topic provides a mixed message.
Most of the recent research has focused on Russian attempts at influencing public
opinion in foreign countries through the traditional media and social media platforms.
345From the mid-2000s onwards, Russia has created external broadcasting services aimed
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exclusively at the Western audience, operating in Western languages and according to
Western standards. The two most emblematic actors are RT and Sputnik, in addition to
a wide network of information websites and groups on social media networks. Contrary to
the Soviet times, Moscow can now easily and steadily reach Western consumers, and thus
350deliver its propaganda and disinformation messages directly. And, what is most impor-
tant, in a form that fits into the Western media environment, thus making the detection of
false narratives a challenge.67
However, previous research68 has shown that Russia’s attempts to foster its point of
view concerning the conflict in Ukraine have been less successful. The research conducted
355by the Riga Stratcom Center in August 2017, shows that in Finland only a minority of the
respondents knew Russia’s two main foreign propaganda channels: Sputnik and RT.
A majority of the respondents do not know or never watch these channels.69 However,
respondents had a clear idea that the news provided by the Russian state media were not
trustworthy. Since a clear minority was familiar with these channels, this conclusion seems
360to have been made on the basis of information about these media. Furthermore, the main
media outlets in Finland and Sweden remain critical towards Russian meta-narratives
about the events leading towards the conflict. Both countries have also confirmed their
support for EU sanctions. In this regard, the Russian propaganda and disinformation has
had little impact in changing the government position.
365A majority of the recent research on Russian information influence seems to focus on
the news media and social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter). The significance of public
opinion in the democratic decision-making process explains why authorities are con-
cerned about these channels of influence. Another, perhaps more practical, reason for this
situation is that there is data available on the fluctuation of narratives, bots, and networks.
370Whereas, it is much harder to trace through the public resources whether other means of
asymmetric approach are used in a particular context. The research on the initial period of
war in Ukraine, on networks operating around the elections in Germany and France, and
the attempts to influence politicians in Sweden and Lithuania, provide glimpses of what
the Active Measures are about in today’s context.
375Conclusion
Russian researchers have questioned an interpretation that the post-Crimean security
situation resembles that of the Cold War. As argued in the IMEMO 2015 forecast, the
basic principles of the Cold War era’s system of international relations, such as nuclear
deterrence, are no longer applicable in the same way as during the Cold War. A new
380element has emerged to this equation, namely, the deep inter-dependence of the global
economic system that provides a “safety belt” against irreversible steps. Furthermore,
Russian analysts argue that strong, and what is most important, diverging economic
interests among the EU member-states will ensure that the EU does not have a unified
policy against Russia. Finally, the analysts argue that multiple regional and global threats
385(e.g., WMD proliferation) require Russia’s participation, or at least its consent or neu-
trality, and therefore, an old-type cold war would be unthinkable.70
At the same time, the above analysis of an asymmetric approach shows that concep-
tualizations developed during the Cold War such as strategic deception, have retained
their significance in Russia’s foreign and security policy. Thus, even if the current situation
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390does not formally fit what is historically known as the Cold War, certain practices used in
neutralizing (as Russians view the task) the conflict potential, even threat towards Russia’s
national interests, do fit the pattern.71 The key assumption in this regard is that the use of
the “organizational weapon”—be it a front organization in the 1960s (e.g., the World
Peace Council) or a pseudo-political entity operating in the Eastern Ukraine (the so called
395Donetsk National Republic, DNR), is controlled from Moscow, and thus, is systemic, not
haphazard.
Two issues should be highlighted in this connection. First, while Active Measures have
a systemic character (and certain patterns can be observed in themes and narratives),
Lenin’s dictum about working with material is still important. This means that the context
400(historical relations with Russia, criminal environment, media space, etc.) shapes the ways
in which Active Measures are used. The second factor to consider is perhaps obvious, but
still worth mentioning. It is taken for granted in the Russian debate that the political (and
economic) rallies, populist movements, and popular uprisings, emerge as a consequence of
external (state) influence. Often this type of argumentation is used in securitizing the
405political opposition in Russia, most recently, in the context of presidential elections.72 But
it can also lead to false expectations (mirror-imagining) during the conflict, and thus,
hamper the resolution of the conflict.
What should be emphasized in the end is that technological development in the
information sphere and global economic interdependency have fundamentally changed
410the societal and political context in which Active Measures are carried out.73 The outcome
is a hybrid—where the Cold War era sentiments about a threat towards the state
sovereignty and political regime are used in legitimating a preventive, asymmetric
approach that in turn, takes advantage of the new technologies and gaps emerging
between and within societies in flux.
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